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On the Relation Between Pay and Performance: Presidents of Liberal Arts Colleges
Imran Lalani

This paper uses panel data on the salaries and benefits of liberal arts
college presidents during the period 2001-02 to 2003-04 to understand
what presidents are rewarded for. We try and develop a basic framework
in which to understand the president's role in the institution, and attempt
to explain what some claim is a combination of high wages and relatively
weak pay for performance.

Introduction:
The rising income inequality in America has been the subject of much heated
debate in the recent past. 'Excessive' executive pay has been a recurrent theme during
2007 so far, with the Senate gearing up to address this imbalance by trying to pass
measures such as limiting income tax deductions companies can claim for executives
leaving the firm during the year. l President Bush also singled out record levels of
executive compensation as a major issue in his 'State of the Economy' speech in
January.2
A similar story emerges when we examine the executive compensation at
universities and colleges across America. While the paychecks that executives in higher
education receive are not as stunning as those in the corporate world, they are hefty in
their own right, especially when compared with the salaries that faculty at their institutes
1
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Sarah Lueck (2007)
Associated Press (2007)
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command. This rise in pay has been especially great in public institutions, with the
number of presidents making half a million dollars or more almost doubling between
2003-04 and 2004-05. Moreover, schools with smaller budgets or less willingness to pay
often lose their presidents to other universities that pay significantly more; the case in
point being three major state universities in Iowa that between them have lost 8
presidents in the last 18 years to institutions that paid significantly more.

3

Unsurprisingly, there has been no shortage of scandal in this sector of the
economy; the case of Vanderbilt University's chancellor Mr. Gee is a good example.
Vanderbilt paid over $6 million to renovate the presidential mansion where Mr. Gee and
his wife resided, as well as paying for parties hosted at the mansion and a personal chef,
at a cost of over $700,000 per year. Concerns also emerged over the use of marijuana at
the mansion. While efforts were made to prevent the issuance of "blank-checks" in the
future, no moves were made to remove Mr. Gee from his position.4
Given these trends in the larger sphere of higher education, it is of interest to
attempt to piece together what exactly presidents are being paid to accomplish, why their
compensation is structured the way it is, and what, if anything can we say about the
industry based on these findings. This paper will focus exclusively on liberal arts colleges
due to the particular interests of the author, and will be arranged as follows. Section I will
comprise of some descriptive statistics, section II a literature review. Section III detail the
theoretical model used, and IV will describe the data used, and its limitations. Section V
will describe the empirical analysis undertaken, and section VI will then attempt to
explain the findings and conclude.
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II - Descriptive statistics:

The introduction mentioned briefly the rising executive pay in the wider highereducation world, and this section will attempt to illustrate the level of pay in institutions
during this period.
Table 1 shows data on the mean salaries of liberal arts college presidents during
2002-03 and 2004-05. Similar data are displayed for mean benefits, sum of salaries and
benefits, as well as average faculty salaries and average faculty benefits.
The average president's salary in 2004-05 was just over $215,000 a year, and
when benefits are included, this swells to over $260,000. The distribution is positively
skewed (skewness = 1.43), hence the mean is pulled above the median as a result of very
high total pay towards the upper tail. The 75 th percentile is $320,000, and in 2004-05
there were 6 institutions that paid salaries of over half a million dollars, and one president
earned over a million (though this incorporated his retirement benefits and deferred
compensation).
On the other hand, during the same year, the average faculty salary was $58,629,
and though the distribution of faculty salaries is also positively skewed (skewness = 0.38)
it is much less so than that of the college presidents.
It is therefore not surprising that to many faculty members, the levels of

presidential compensation seem far out of line. However, the argument is made that
presidents are the CEOs of institutions with operating budgets of tens of millions of
dollars, and as such are actually paid much less than their counterparts in the corporate
world.
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Table 1 (Comparative Statistics):
Liberal arts college presidents5:
SaIary:
Year

N

2002-03
2003-04
2004-05

186
195
215

Bonus'
Year

N

2002-03
2003-04
2004-05

186
195
215

Combined total'
:
N
Year
2002-03
2003-04
2004-05

186
195
215

Mean

Median

206,345
209,930
215,384

200,417
203,458

160,111
155,774

210,062

165,945

Median

Mean
42,155
48,589
44,783

Mean

25 tn
Percentile
17,919
17,912
17,023

29,357
32,322
30,886

Median

248,500
258,520
260,168

25 tn
Percentile

25 th
Percentile

234,358
244,451
249,702

181 ,526
179,873
185,092

th

75
Percentile
249,883
254,750
268,441

75 th
Percentile
45,707
48,351
56,334

75 th
Percentile
296,536
306,694
320,274

Faculty Salaries in liberal arts collegel:
Average saI ary:
Year
N

2002-03
2003-04
2004-05
A vera~e

Year
2002-03
2003-04
2004-05
5
6

208
211
210

Mean

Median
55,557
56,947
58,629

54,339
55,538
56,936

benefit spending per faculty member:
N
Mean
Median
208
211
210

25 tn
Percentile

14,979
15,581

14,858
15,404

16,132

16,294

48,543
48,729
49,921

25 m
Percentile

Author's calculations. Data taken from the Chronicle of Higher Education.
Author's calculations. Data taken from IPEDS surveys.

11 ,837
12,688
12,824

7510
Percentile
64,176
64,866
66,733

75 th
Percentile
18,526
18,623
19,633
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II - Literature review:
In order to examine executive compensation in liberal arts colleges, it is necessary
to first get a better sense of what these institutions aim to accomplish. Liberal arts
colleges are quite different from most other institutions of higher learning in the United
States. For example, Liberal Arts Colleges typically offer less in the way of preprofessional training, do not place much emphasis on an in-house graduate program
(which competes with undergraduate programs over the institution's resources), place a
relatively smaller weight on faculty research (especially when compared to research
universities. As a result, liberal arts colleges focus almost exclusively on undergraduate
education. In this sense, we can view Liberal Arts Colleges as offering a very specific
product within the higher education universe, but one which can be studied using the
kinds of tools developed to address the typical institution of higher education.
Rothschild and White (1995) focus on education technology having mUltiple
inputs and outputs. The production function has constant returns to scale, and students are
both inputs and outputs in the process (since education is a jointly consumed good). The
college internalizes this externality through price discrimination (financial aid dependent
on quality, defined in some way, of each student). The production technology produces
units of human capital, which are then allocated amongst students. The net price to each
student is therefore the tuition less the amount that student contributes to the human
capital of his schoolmates. Therefore, the tuition for each student should ideally be equal
to her net human capital increment. Hence when making the decision about which
colleges to apply to, and which colleges to accept, each student looks to maximize her net
human capital within her budget constraint. On the basis of these ideas, we might begin

.
6
to think of liberal arts colleges competing over a pool of applicants; varying the effective
price paid by each potential student for the chosen level of institutional quality to attract a
certain body of students.
Turning to the issue of executive compensation in these sorts of institutions leads
us to Hallock (2002), who estimated the impact of performance on the highest paid
officers of non-profit organizations. His results show that firm size, the ratio of program
spending to total spending, and total fundraising were significant drivers of non-profit
executives' pay. Carroll, Hughes and Lukesitch (2005) formulate a very similar model,
except they define performance as the ratio of revenue from each activity to its associated
cost. In their sub sample of educational non-profits, they found a positive impact of
performance on compensation, though for fundraising, this remained statistically
insignificant. When they included an interaction term between program services and
fundraising, they found a positive and significant relationship with compensation. Hence
it is not enough to fund raise; one must put that money to good use.
Ehrenberg (2000), and O'Connell (2005) are two papers that try and empirically
estimate what presidents of institutes of higher education are rewarded for, and find some
interesting results. Ehrenberg (2000), using panel data for 1992-93 to 1996-97 finds that
compensation is positively related to size of institution, and institutional quality, but also
finds that for presidents who have a tenure of four or more years, change in compensation
is not related to fundraising success. O'Connell (2005) finds similar results, using crosssectional data for the period 1995-96 and focusing solely on liberal arts colleges. The
paper also finds that pay is negatively related to alumni giving rate. This seems offputting at first, but makes more sense when one realizes that given a high historic level of

7
alumni giving, there is likely to be lesser emphasis on increasing that particular statistic
than a college with a historically low rate of alumni giving.
The rate of alumni giving may in fact be a poor indicator of presidential success,
since it is much more open to distortion, and it is not exactly clear what it measures; a
high alumni giving rate does not necessarily reflect a high rate of fundraising, but could
reflect something else entirely. For example, colleges knowing that alumni giving rates
are often used by ranking agencies can encourage their alumni to give smaller donations
spread out over time; a one time 15 dollar gift can be made into a 5 dollar gift each year
for three years. It is for these reasons that this paper does not use the alumni giving rates
as an explanatory variable, and instead uses actual fundraising levels.
The paper itself can best be thought of as an extension of the O'Connell (2005)
paper, where it differs from that paper is we attempt to estimate performance based pay
on presidential salary, benefits, and a measure of estimated deferred compensation
(whereas O'Connell focuses on salary alone). By taking this approach we hope to shed
some light on the different roles of these components, and hope to gain a better
understanding of compensation packages. Moreover, O'Connell does not include tenure
of presidents in his regression, while we do. We also attempt to see if relative
performance measures are considered important when deciding pay, and introduce a new
fundraising variable, the top gifts in various categories (see next section) to tackle the
issue of attribution.

111 - Model
In the case of for-profit firms, executive compensation is often viewed as a means
of ameliorating the principal-agent problem; that is structuring the incentives ofthe agent

8

to bring the executive's (agent's) interests in line with the interests of the principal. In the
case of liberal arts colleges, there is no explicit "shareholder value" to maximize, and so
we develop a basic framework wherein colleges compete over students on the basis of
(educational) quality at a given effective price.
We begin by making the following assumptions:
1. Liberal Arts Colleges are monopolistic competitors, and they try to
differentiate their products by changing level of quality for (an effective) level
of price.
2. Assume that demand is dependent on quality and price s.t. people are willing
to pay more for a higher quality product, but at a diminishing rate.
3. Since there is status associated with teaching at or working for a college with
a particular level of quality, there is an incentive for teachers and trustees to
maximize quality of their institutions.
4. Education is jointly consumed, i.e. students are also inputs in the education
process, and so if you want to get the "best" education, you should have the
"best" students possible at your college 7
5. Education is considered societally beneficial, and that therefore there is
pressure to educate the maximum number of students possible given the
budget constraints faced.

Given these points, we then modify Newhouse's model of a Hospital to the Liberal Arts
College. Assume that a Liberal Arts college seeks to maximize quality (Qual):
"Best" students can be defined as those having characteristics like academic excellence, minorities,
different socio-economic status. The argument is made that financial aid is a way to internalize the positive
externality of different students as well as a way to gather maximum consumer surplus for each college

7
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Qual = f(Cost,Quantity)

Max

s.t.

Revenue ;;:: Cost
Qual 2: Qualmin
Price = p

Where:
Cost = Cost associated with educating n students at the level of quality Q
Total Revenue = Fee income from students + Endowment Income
Qualmin = Minimum allowed level of quality (i.e. minimum needed for accrediting)
The effective Price of the product is p,

aQual ;;:: 0, and aQual ~ 0
aCost
aQ
Based on the above problem, the college will pick some optimal level of Quality
and Quantity, given the effective price for a student is p. Now assume that fundraising is
allowed. In this case the total revenue is higher than before, and the college is able to now
re-optimize and reach a higher indifference curve. 8 Hence if Liberal Arts Colleges
compete on the basis of quality at a given effective price, fundraising plays a vital role.
Knowing that one of the primary responsibilities of the president is to fundraise, we
should expect to see a strong relationship between fundraising and presidential pay.
Armed with a basic idea of what the objective function of the trustees is, we can
now model the relationship of the president and the trustees in terms of the principalagent framework. In this case the "principal" would refer to the trustees and "the agent",
the president. We modify the Grossman and Hart (1983) framework to explain this
relationship.

8

For a more detailed explanation, see Newhouse (1970) pp. 67-69
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The principal wishes the agent to pick the optimal level of quantity and quality at
a given price. Further, she wishes the agent to maximize net fundraising (as shown
above). Assume that the principal can exert different levels of effort, and that higher
levels of effort 9 increase the probability of a higher institutional indifference curve being
reached. Moreover, the agent experiences disutility of effort and positive utility of
income; hence in order for the agent to be willing to exert a certain level of effort, the
positive utility of income she gets must at least equal the disutility of that level of effort.
Hence we can represent the agent's utility function as:

U(a,I) = K(a)V(I)
Where I is the income the agent receives, K(a) is the disutility of effort level a, and V(I)
is the positive utility of income I, s. t.

Hence we see an increasing utility of income, but decreasing marginal utility of
income, and that there is a minimum income level

Imin,

which corresponds to the agent's

next best alternative. Below this level of utility the agent prefers to work elsewhere (or
enjoy leisure).

Effort is not restricted to time spent working, but contains other factors like difficult decisions on
downsizing etc. which are hard to observe.

9

..
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We can represent the effect of the agent choosing effort level a on the institution' s
wellbeing as:
n

B(a)

=

L

IIi (a) qi

i=1

Where:
IIi (a) is the probability that quality level qj will be reached given effort level a.

The principal fmds it difficult to observe the level of effort the president is
expending, but if we assume that the principal knows the probability function of different
levels of effort on fundraising success, then she can reward outcomes instead of effort
and seek to maximize expected effort, or bring expected effort into line with some
specified level of effort that the principal desires from the agent.

Let I = { 11, 12 , h, ... , In }

Where Ii is the income for the agent if the college achieves quality level qj,
Given this, the agent seeks to choose effort level a s.t.
n

max

L

I1i (a) U(a,l)

i=1

And the principal, knowing this, first calculates minimum Ii s.t. it enforces a level of
effort a*
n

mm

L
i=1

IIi (a*) Ii

12
s.t.
n

L

n

TI j (a*) U(a*, Ii) 2:

i=1

n

L

L n (a) U(a, Ii )

Va < a*

i=1

n

1

(a*) U(a* , I-)
.
1 >
_ U mm

i=1

i.e. minimize the expected payment to the agent given expected utility of payment of
action a* must be greater than or equal to the agent's minimum desired utility, and the
expected utility of payment or action a* must be greater than or equal to the expected
utility of any other action a, where a < a*. There may be values of a* for which this is not
possible, and if so, then the principal takes the cost of inducing that particular level of
effort as

00.

Knowing the values of Ii, the principal now sets about optimizing her objective
function (Le. maximizing quality)

n

max

L
i=1

n

TIi (a*) qi -

L

TIi (a*) Ii

i=1

In the standard principal agent model in the for-profit world, it is assumed that the
level of effort cannot be observed, but the principal knows the utility function of the
agent and can structure payment contingent on what it is the principal is trying to
maximize S.t. the expected value of the agent's effort is equal to the level the principal
wishes (see above). In the for-profit case, the principal often seeks to maximize
shareholder value, as this is a clearly observable market-based measure of company
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performance. However, in the case of the Liberal Arts College, no such single gauge of
value is readily available. It is true that there are a broad range ofmetrics that can be used
to judge an institution's success, e.g. different types ofrankings, various statistics etc.
however these indicators are not as clear, as regulated, as widely traded, and not as easily
accessible as share-price information. While it is true that share prices may be
manipulated, the fact that there is a well developed market for these commodities,
coupled with considerable regulatory oversight means that this measure is potentially a
truer or clearer sense of value than college rankings which do not share these features,
and may therefore be less reflective of 'true' value; imperfections may take longer to be
identified, etc.
Hence if we assume that effort levels are unobservable directly in this instance,
then the question becomes how to gauge the firm's performance, and the agent's
influence on it. Faced with this problem, it is useful to go back to the modification of the
Newhouse model presented earlier. If colleges are competing over quality at a given
effective price level, then it makes sense to view the role of the agent as trying to set the
effective price, quality and quantity level at the 'optimal' level. In order to ensure that the
agent does, in fact try to achieve this target, we would expect some proportion of
compensation to depend upon these variables. In the next section, we try and empirically
estimate this relationship. We hope to show the extent of the 'pay for performance', and
document the nature of this relationship. 10

10 Alternately, if there does not exist a pay for perfonnance relationship, we will attempt to explain the
reasons for this given what we know about the fIrms organization and the market.
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IV - Data used, and its limitations:
Our study uses panel data on the 220 institutions defined as liberal arts
baccalaureate colleges by the 2000 Carnegie Classification over the period 2001-02 to
2003-04. These institutions are primarily undergraduate colleges with major emphasis on
baccalaureate programs, and award at least half of their baccalaureate degrees in liberal
arts fields.
Information on salaries and benefits paid to the presidents of these colleges must
be reported to the IRS by law annually. This data has been collected by the Chronicle of
Higher Education for academic years 1995-96 to 2004-05. We use the subset for the

period 2002-03 to 2004-05, and combine this with data on president's gender, tenure, the
religious association of school, and if the president was serving as an interim president
which was collected through web research. These data are not perfect by any means;
problems range from sometimes failing to report deferred compensation "earned" during
the year, to failing to report additional income the president may receive from serving on
related organizations like university foundations. Institutions often undervalue or fail to
report perks associated with the presidential office; living in a beautiful mansion or
having a private chef etc. Moreover, the benefits reported are the total of health, and
pension plans as well as the total deferred compensation that were paid or designated that
year. As such it is not a "clean" measure of a bonus (which would ostensibly reflect
performance). That being said, the form 990 reports are the best source of presidential
compensation data that the author is aware of.
Information on average faculty salaries and benefits for these institutions, and
average SAT scores over the period 2001-02 to 2003-04 is taken from the Integrated
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Post-Secondary Education Data System (IPEDS). Average facility salaries are computed
by summing the expenditures on assistant, associate and full professors and dividing by
the numbers of professors in each group. To estimate the average SAT score, we add the
25 th percentile of the verbal and math score to the 75 th percentile verbal and math score
and divide the resulting number by two. For institutions that had a majority of students
submit ACT scores, the average ACT score (calculated similarly) was converted to its
SAT equivalent based on collegeboard guidelines. I I
Information on total fundraising per student, full time equivalent emollment, and
total endowment per student was taken from the Council for Aid to Education'S
Voluntary Support of Education Survey's "calculated statistics" and "endowment details"
for the period 2001-02 to 2003-04.
It is important to keep in mind when decisions on presidential compensation are

being made; salary decisions are made in the spring or summer preceding the academic
year, and so we take care to use information available to trustees at that time. Hence to
examine 2002-03 compensation data, we use the data outlined above from 2001-02, and
follow the same pattern for other years.

v - Empirics:
Based on the ideas expressed in the previous section, we would expect
presidential pay to be related to the quality of the incoming class, the level of fundraising
success (income), the endowment level (wealth), and the size of the institution.

11

This is the same procedure used by Ehrenberg (2000)
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In addition, we would expect the level of pay to be determined by characteristics
of the presidents and the institutions they serve 12 • For example the president's gender, the
number of years they have served as president of that institution, and whether it is the
president's last year at the institution is likely to have an impact on the salary they
command. Further, if the institution is religiously affiliated, it might place less emphasis
on market forces and hire like-minded presidents who may be willing to accept lower
wages when part of an organization that shares and promotes their religious beliefs. 13
We would expect that variables reflecting the income and wealth of the school
would tend to matter as determinants of presidential pay. Hence institutions that have
higher endowments per student, and higher average faculty pay are likely to pay their
presidents more than those with lower figures. This could come about from a number of
possible sources; colleges may, for example pay professors and administrators what they

can, rather than simply the market clearing wage, as an incentive for loyalty or better
faculty relations etc. Moreover, ifthis is the case, and demand for presidents is greater
than supply, then there may even be a case where presidents will demand higher
compensation from colleges that have higher endowments and faculty pay than in other
schools, all else equal. We must therefore be very careful when interpreting the coefficient on the endowment and faculty salaries variables; a positive co-efficient could for
example, be seen as rewarding a president for past performance (possible not even her
own). However this is not necessarily the case, it is more a question of historical pay

12 We try an institution fixed-effects regression to account for some of the characteristics of institutions that
lend themselves to presidential pay, but find no statistically significant results. This may be since our
sample is only over a three year period and therefore does not contain sufficient variation to be picked up.
\3 Note: The author was unable to obtain reliable information on previous presidential tenure, and was
unable to include it in the regression analysis conducted. Ehrenberg (2000) also finds that this variable is
insignificant in liberal arts colleges.
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rates, as well as endowment growth (please see the following section for a more detailed
examination).
Moreover, we would expect the level offundraising per student to be particularly
important as a determinant of presidential pay, as this is one of the central duties ofthe
president, and (as shown above) this is a vital activity for all liberal arts colleges.
Presidents in their last year are often awarded hefty retirement packages, part of
which are logged as deferred compensation and therefore are booked as part of the
benefits figure reported to the IRS. We try and account for this by including a dummy for
the president's last year.
Interim presidents are likely to serve a slightly different role than longer-term
appointees; they may for example simply be filling a position for a semester until a
replacement is found and may not be expected to perform at the same level, or have the
same priorities as a full-time president. Hence we removed all interim presidents from
our sample.
There are many measures of student quality, but the one that we selected was
average SAT scores. This variable has an added advantage in that the average SAT score
affects the level of selectivity of an institution and therefore its applicant pool, and the
fraction of students who accept offers of admission (yield). Moreover it also affects the
effective price the institution can charge each student, as higher scores tend to raise a
student's willingness to pay. SAT scores are also widely reported for the colleges in the
sample over this period, and were therefore felt this was the best statistic for our purpose.
As noted in the sections above, since colleges are competing over a common pool
of applicants, it is not absolute performance that should matter most, but performance

18
relative to the market. That is to say we would expect a fundraising level of $1,000 per
student to be rewarded differently during a year when the economy is in recession, and
during a period of rapid economic growth. To this end we tabulate average revenue
variables per period and include the log difference of these and the respective variables
for each institution.
We discussed earlier that benefits as reported on the form 990 include sum of total
health and pension plans as well as deferred compensation. Since deferred compensation
is one of the main sources for performance linked pay in non-profit companies,14 a
cleaner estimate would be useful. We assume that the benefit spending per president at a
given institution (e.g. healthcare plans etc.) is not very different from that on the average
faculty member. As such by subtracting the average benefit data from the presidential
benefit data, we hope to arrive at a better indicator of deferred compensation.
Our first set of regression results follows on the next page.

14
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President Salary and Benefits Equations (2002-03 to 2004-05 sample)15

Log Salary

Log Benefits

Log Total

Log Estimated
Deferred Comp

Constant

8.536271
(22.70612)

5.075098
(4.74366)

8.075105
(17 .8543)

2.991118
(1.77329)

Female

-0.04226
(-1.20071)

0.051644
(0.53251)

-0.01447
(-0.34169)

0.241348
(1.59216)

Number of years at
present institution

0.002825
(0.92121)

0.01778
(2.02176)

0.006123
(1.65935)

0.021876
(1.61638)

Last year at
Institution

0.001438
(0.03603)

0.107371
(0.97295)

0.044288
(0.92253)

0.085028
(0.4975)

Average SAT
scores

0.000793
(3.45226)

0.001436
(2.19414)

0.000857
(3.10318)

0.310881
(1.00224)

Religion

-0.24074
(-3.44782)

0.056994
(0.29341)

-0.21462
(-2.55493)

0.002389
(2.31279)

Log Enrollment

0.245875
(5.7211 )

0.245127
(2.02566)

0.275565
(5.32977)

0.250977
(1.34355)

Log of Endowment
per student

0.06831
(2.39383)

0.135302
(1.7155)

0.084487
(2.46103)

0.2183
(1.7991)

Log of Fundraising
per student

0.028902
(0.88843)

0.034132
(0.36468)

0.043661
(1.11559)

-0.04409
(-0.29388)

Number of
Observations

265

265

265

265

R-Squared

0.41

0.18

0.38

0.16

From the results above, it seems that it is the salary variable that is most
influenced by performance, with salary and total pay providing a much better fit as
measured by R-squared than either benefits, or our estimated deferred compensation.

15

T -Statistics reported below co-efficient estimates
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Since deferred compensation is thought to playa major role in incentivizing nonprofit management, it is strange that the model should have such limited predictive
power. On the other hand, within this model, we find that the number of years in office
both has a stronger impact on benefits than salary, and is statistically significant. This
would seem to indicate that benefits seem to provide a different role from pay, serving as
both an incentive to stay with the college (or reward retirement) as well as helping to
induce the required level of effort. Given the much weaker predictive power associated
with using this model for benefits, we may also imagine that benefits are meant to reward
some other measures of performance not included in the model.
If we examine our estimated deferred compensation within this model, we find it
does not add much to the analysis in terms of a better fit. This leads us to believe that
either presidential benefits are very different from the average faculty benefits (and hence
that our 'clean' measure of deferred compensation is actually pretty dirty), or that
deferred compensation is not one of the main ways of rewarding performance as
measured above.
Keeping in mind that all findings are ceteris paribus (other variables in the model
held constant) from the results above total presidential pay rises by about 8.6% for every
100 point increase in average SAT scores. Tenure is related in only a limited fashion to
total pay, with each additional year in office yielding only a 0.6% increase in total pay.
As expected, religious affiliation of school leads to about a 20% decrease in total
presidential pay. For every 10% increase in student enrollment, there is a 2.5% increase
in presidential pay. The effect of gender is statistically insignificant, over this period, as
is the dummy for the last year in office. There is a weak relationship between endowment
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per student and total pay, but what is most surprising is that the relationship between
fundraising per student and total pay is not statistically significant.
Expanding the model to account for relative performance, we get:
President Salary and Benefits Equations (2002-03 to 2004-05 sample)16
Log Total
Log Salary
Log Benefits
Log Estimated
Deferred Comp

Constant

10.13199
(21 .74156)

9.318563
(4.87748)

9.885522
(16.44945)

8.015928
(2.76837)

Female

-0.05287
(-0.97418)

-0.06654
(-0.35549)

-0.01898
(-0.27123)

0.259838
(0.8776)

Number of years at
present institution

0.002676
(0.57526)

-0.02303
(-1.41678)

-0.00367
(-0.6121)

-0.03967
(-1 .62435)

Last year at
Institution

0.062949
(0.98968)

0.827427
(3.7719)

0.286968
(3.49862)

1.12202
(3.46296)

Differenced average
SAT scores

0.000157
(0.43608)

-0.00072
(-0.57072)

-5.4E-05
(-0.11505)

-0.00052
(-0.26914)

Religion

0
(0)

0
(0)

0

(O)

0
(0)

Log Enrollment

0.209004
(3.86819)

0.117518
(0.62152)

0.225369
(3.23447)

0.204645
(0.72153)

Log difference of
Endowment per
student

0.05256
(2.56513)

-0.02209
(-0.21775)

0.062217
(2.3546)

0.011582
(0.07656)

Log difference of
Fundraising per
student
N

0.028067
(1 .07648)

0.14059
(1.56175)

0.05868
(1.74525)

0.110374
(0.8025)

265

265

265

265

R-Squared

0.42

0.28

0.42

0.21

16 Expressions ofthe form 'Log difference of Endowment per student' refers to 'Log Endowment per
student at institution (i) - Log average Endowment per student in sample'
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This table shows some very interesting results. When we include variables
relating performance relative to the market, (e.g. the log ofthe difference between the
total fundraising per student in an institution and the average fundraising per student for
that year etc.), we find that relative fundraising success becomes significant (though its
magnitude remains quite small) to presidential pay. Hence, for every ten percent increase
above average annual fundraising per student (for the sample, holding all other variables
constant), presidential pay increases by 0.29%.
Relative SAT scores do not seem to influence presidential pay, and neither does
the number of years of tenure, or gender. Interestingly, religious affiliation of the school
fails to have any impact on presidential pay when we use this model, suggesting that
religious institutions reward relative performance much the same way that secular
schools do.
Again, this model loses significant predictive power when we try and estimate it
using benefits data or our estimated deferred compensation variable, which provides
some limited support for the ideas discussed earlier.
One possible reason for finding that fundraising is not closely related to
presidential pay is the question of attribution; to what extent can fundraising be attributed
to the president, and tow what extent is it the result of work done by the development
office or other sources. Presidents might be expected to restrict their fundraising activities
to high net-worth individuals, and hence a better indication of fundraising success might
be by looking at the largest gifts each year. The Chronicle of Higher Education publishes
data on the three largest bequests, individual, corporate, and foundation gifts, and we reestimated our models using this total, but found that these remained inconclusive. While
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the top three gifts in these categories may reflect presidential fundraising more clearly
than the aggregate number, it is likely to under-represent fundraising (since the president
is likely to secure more than just three gifts, or may secure a number of smaller gifts etc.).
Rewarding endowment levels and not fundraising levels is problematic for a
number of reasons. Firstly, the growth of the endowment per student is dependent on the
yield on the endowment (which is out of the control of the president, apart from possibly
discussing with trustees which investment professional to hire), the amount which the
endowment is drawn upon (which may create perverse incentives; for example forgoing
capital expenditures that may increase school quality and attract 'better' students as it
reduces the endowment level) and finally the amount of capital contributed to it at the
end of each period (another possible perverse incentive, as revenue may be invested into
the endowment rather than being used to pay for quality or price improvements). On the
other hand, fundraising seems to be a much better instrument, since according to our
model, fundraising plays an important role in maintaining the competitiveness of the
institution, and seems less open to perverse incentives, especially when rewarded relative
to the market.

VI - Summary and Conclusions:
Our paper seems to show some limited evidence for the hypothesis that presidents
are rewarded for institutional performance. SAT scores of incoming freshmen, as well as
the level of endowment per student, average faculty salaries and the size of the institution
seem to be drivers of presidential pay. Presidential benefits seem to be designed more
towards maintaining a relationship with the college, and encouraging presidents to remain
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in office (or rewarding retirement). There is some limited evidence for relative
fundraising being more important to trustees than absolute levels of fundraising.
However, the importance placed in endowment levels may also reflect a longer-term
view of the trustees; by ensuring a large endowment, trustees are potentially looking to
assure that the institution endures for a loner period of time than it might otherwise do.
These results suggest some interesting insights into what trustees value. While
Quality ofthe institution is important (as measured by SAT scores) as a driver of
presidential pay, fundraising (which according to our model should be a driver of
quality), does not seem to be emphasized by trustees. This may mean that when trustees
sit down to decide presidential pay for the preceding period, they pay more attention to
realized quality improvements over fundraising success. However, presidents realize the
importance offundraising to overall quality, and therefore seek to carry out the level that
yields the level of quality that the college's trustees desire.
The relatively scarce evidence for performance linked pay may reflect the
complicated nature ofthe president's job; it may be difficult to restrict it to performance
in just a few areas, and may involve a number of additional functions such as faculty
r:elations, alumni events etc. or it may be that pay serves as a mechanism to ensure
presidents stay with the college and continue to perform. Hence, it may well be a sort of
modified 'efficiency wage' that is being paid to college presidents; by offering a
president large salary and benefits package, the option of a potentially long and
rewarding relationship, coupled with possible dismissal for failing to meet certain basic
levels of performance (or malfeasance etc.) colleges make employment as executive itself
very appealing. In order to continue this employment, the president must therefore exert a
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certain level of effort and achieve a certain level of performance. Akerlof (1984)
proposes that some labor contracts may be viewed as partial gift exchanges, in the sense
that when firms pay employees above-market wages, employees reciprocate by exerting
higher levels of effort than the baseline required, and that this additional effort reflects in
some sense a 'gift' to the employer. Moreover efficiency wages make sense in a setting
where the objective function of the institution is difficult to measure, as are notions of
institutional performance. Since there are fairly complicated and possibly different
objectives for institutions in our sample, and since there is no standard way to measure
these objectives, highly incentivized pay may create either perverse incentives, or lead to
focusing solely on some aspects of the job at the expense of others. Lastly, the lack of a
strong pay for performance relationship may also be explained if effort levels are more
easily observed, and if each college suffers shocks to the admissions process
independently of its competitors. In this scenario, we would expect that presidents would
be rewarded directly for the amount of effort they expend, and not observed outcomes.
Indeed, rewarding presidents for performance in this case would penalize them. 17

17 The author is indebted to V.V. Chari, Professor of Economics at the University of Minnesota for this
insight.
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AI!I~endix:

Salary and Benefits Equations (2002-03 to 2004-05 sample)18

Log Salary
Constant
Female

3.789048
2.4687
-0.05233
-1.50663

Benefits

Total

2.508507
0.57574

3.613934
1.94219

0.046516
0.47724

-0.02392
-0.56821

Number of years at
present institution

0.001701
0.56065

0.017284
1.95452

0.005066
1.37722

Last year at
Institution

-0.0035
-0.08932

0.105201
0.95158

0.039643
0.83332

Average SAT
scores

0.000184
0.62286

0.00111
1.31085

0.000285
0.79613

0.058762
0.3021

0.21518

Religion

-0.24134
-3.51769

Log Enrollment per
student

0.205363
4.65668

0.22354
1.77043

2.58706
0.237493
4.44202

Log Endowment
per student

0.040247
1.36943

0.120365
1.45532

0.058115
1.63105

Log Fundraising
per student

0.034207
1.06871

0.036497
0.38911

0.048646
1.25361

Log Average
Faculty Salaries

0.55179
3.18665

0.297837
0.60773

0.518541
2.47012

N

265

265

265

R-Squared

0.431

0.178

0.395

18 When we include average faculty salary information, the significance and magnitude of some of the
performance variables is reduced, since they affect faculty pay as well.
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Salary and Benefits Equations (2002-03 to 2004-05 sample)
Log Salary

Benefits

Total

-0.05355
-0.28729

16.86288
3.57
-0.05355
-0.28729

10.4106
5.78936
-0.01238
-0.1743

Number of years at
present institution

-0.01151
-0.63277

-0.01151
-0.63277

-0.00213
-0.31948

Last year at
Institution

0.812427
3.66748

0.812427
3.66748

0.291735
3.45848

Average SAT
scores

0.0009
0.60232

0.0009
0.60232

0.000315
0.55397

Religion

0
0

0
0

0.000315
0.55397

Log Enrollment per
student

0.254124
1.21912

0.254124
1.21912

0.244218
3.17153

-0.01104
-0.10636

0.054914
2.01554

Constant

16.86288
3.57

Female

Log Endowment
per student

-0.01104
-0.10636

Log Fundraising
per student

0.129665
1.37433

0.129665
1.37433

0.055984
1.56409

Log Average
Faculty Salaries

-1.00427
-1.67743

-1.00427
-1.67743

-0.10055
-0.45521

N

265

265

265

R-Squared

0.432

0.267

0.413
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Presidential Pay and Benefits (Using largest giftS)19

Log Salary
Constant

Female

8.685736
24.02725
-0.03924
-1.11563

Benefits
5.25625
5.12878
0.054972
0.56813

Total
8.25462
18.9671
-0.01073
-0.25352

Number of years at
present institution

0.0032
1.04204

0.018438
2.10721

0.006542
1.76974

Last year at
Institution

0.002125
0.05315

0.10764
0.97484

0.044848
0.93174

Average SAT
scores

0.000813
3.55018

0.001476
2.27848

0.000884
3.20688

0.051401
0.26416

-0.2233
-2.65075

Religion

-0.24863
-3.55333

Log Enrollment
per student

0.23529
5.4118

0.232684
1.91324

0.254818
4.86827

Log of Endowment
per student

0.082157
3.07087

0.149922
2.013

0.101204
3.14209

-0.00052
-0.00753

0.008618
0.2896

Log of Top 9 Gifts

-7.8E-05
-0.00317

Number of
Observations

265

265

265

R-Squared

0.407

0.178

0.378

'1 have adhered to the Honor Code on this Assignment'
1mran Lalani

19 The Chronicle ofHigher Education publishes data on the three largest bequests, individual, corporate,
and foundation gifts

